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ARE HOUSEKEEPERS LIKE JUDGES?
Stephen P. Garvey t
INTRODUCTION
Professor Greenawalt proposes that we look at interpretation
"from the bottom up."1 By taking a close look at informal relation-
ships between an authority and his or her agent, and how the agent
"faithfully performs" instructions within such relationships, he hopes
to gain insight into the problems surrounding the interpretation of
legal directives.2 Professor Greenawalt's analysis displays all the sub-
tlety, imagination, and insight we have come to expect from him.
The analysis of "falthful performance" in informal contexts which
Professor Greenawalt presents in From the Bottom Up is the first step in
a larger project.3 His next step is to see what lessons the interpreta-
tion of instructions in informal contexts has for law. 4 This Comment
tries to contribute to that next step.
One might continue Professor Greenawalt's project in one of at
least two ways (though Professor Greenawalt may have neither in
mind). First, one could try to identify the insights developed in the
informal context and then transpose them more or less directly onto
the legal context. Second, one could try to stay roughly within the
context of informal relationships of authority, but try to make them
look more like the relationships of authority that typically obtain
within law. I take the second of these two approaches.
In Part I, I offer some variations on one of the stories Professor
Greenawalt uses to explore "bottom-up" interpretation. These varia-
tions, inspired by the growing literature on statutory interpretation,
add assorted complications to Professor Greenawalt's basic story in an
effort to move that story "toward the top" and closer to the realities of
t Associate Professor, Comell Law School. I would like to thank Dean Russell Os-
good and Professors Gary Simson and Robert S. Summers for helpful suggestions on a
prior draft.
1 Kent Greenawalt, From the Bottom Up, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 994 (1997).
2 Id. at 999. In addition to the idea of "faithful performance," Professor Greenawalt's
article focuses on the "more conceptual question of what ...prescriptive standards
'mean.'" Id. at 995. In this connection, he argues persuasively that "[wie need to recog-
nize that 'the meaning of an instruction' is ambiguous and may be answered in different
ways." Id. at 1017. For present purposes, I will concentrate only on the notion of "faithful
performance."
3 Id. at 995.
4 1d. at 995-96.
1039
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
legal interpretation.5 I should note that these variations are presented
primarily to stimulate thought. It is well beyond the scope of this
Comment to try to resolve what faithful performance would require in
the face of them.
Professor Greenawalt does not directly enter the contemporary
debate surrounding questions of statutory interpretation. He does
not take sides with any of the schools of thought on that subject.
Nonetheless, he does show how important a principal's subjective in-
tent is to an agent's effort to faithfully perform, 6 and he does hope
"we can learn something about... the possible legal relevance of the
intent of those who issue directions."7 Accordingly, Part II closes with




Professor Greenawalt asks us to entertain two stories. The first is
about Georgia, who directs her housekeeper Kent to "fetch soupmeat
every Monday from Store X' while she is away.8 Kent must decide
what to do when confronted with different obstacles that leave him
wondering exactly how he should proceed. The second story is about
Cheryl, a basketball player whose team is ahead by three points and
whose coach says in the final minutes of the game, "Don't shoot; run
out the clock."9 Cheryl, who finds herself beneath the basket with an
easy shot, must decide whether to take it.1O Professor Greenawalt's
analysis of these stories, along with several permutations of them, is
fine-grained, nuanced, and illuminating. He shoWs us that figuring
5 Professor Greenawalt is well aware of the complications involved in such a move.
E.g., id. at 1033-34. I confess at the outset that some of the variations I sketch may seem
farfetched and far removed from "real" life. Yet inasmuch as one needs to introduce such
"farfetchedness" in order to bring the realities of informal relationships closer to the reali-
ties of statutory interpretation, this itself may suggest something about the limits of using
informal relationships to shed light on the problems of statutory interpretation.
6 Id. at 1033-35.
7 Id. at 995. Judge Posner and William Eskridge, among others, have also examined
informal relationships of authority in the hopes of shedding some light on questions of
statutory interpretation. WiLitM N. ESKRIDE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
124 (1994) (arguing that the platoon analogy supports an even more flexible approach to
statutory interpretation than Posner suggests); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURIS-
PRUDENCE 269-73 (1990) (using platoon analogy to support "pragmatic" approach).
8 Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1002. The story can be traced to Francis Leiber. FRAN-
cis LEIBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28-29 (enlarged ed. 1839).
9 Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 998.
10 See id.
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out how to perform faithfully is sometimes fairly straightforward,
and sometimes quite complicated. 12
Though different in some respects, these basic stories share a few
common features. In each, we have one readily identifiable principal
who issues instructions in an effort to faithfully serve the common
good of some broader group. For Georgia, the broader group is her
family; for the coach, her team. We also have in each story a single
agent who wants nothing more than to perform faithfully. For the
sake of simplicity, I will focus on the Georgia-Kent story and introduce
variations in which one or more of these features is missing.
A. The Not-Entirely Faithful Head-of-Household
Suppose that Georgia's directive to Kent involves not soupmeat,
but rather, an exotic and expensive variety of kiwi fruit. Kent is di-
rected to buy this kiwi every Monday at Store X Kent knows, however,
that Georgia's decision to buy the kiwi was not based purely on her
belief that kiwi is good for the children. Instead, Georgia's decision
was in part the result of an "understanding" she had earlier reached
with the grocer of Store X What's the story behind this understand-
ing? It goes something like this.
Imagine that Georgia is the children's foster parent. She pro-
fesses great love and concern for them, and she is widely regarded as a
good care-provider. In return for Georgia's services, the foster care
agency pays her a modest sum, which she looks forward to receiving
every month. Still, she serves at the agency's discretion and is anxious
to remain in its good graces. As it happens, Store Xs grocer plays golf
with the head of the agency and is therefore in a marvelous position
to say nice things about Georgia. In exchange for these nice words,
Georgia reaches an "understanding" with the grocer that she will send
Kent to buy kiwi from him every Monday. This arrangement benefits
the grocer because, we might imagine, he makes an above-average
profit on his expensive and exotic kiwi. We might further suppose
that the "agreement" between Georgia and the grocer is not open and
express, but is based instead on tacit understandings. Kent is none-
theless fully aware of what's going on.
Suppose also that Georgia has told Kent that she wants to provide
the children with a healthy and nutritious diet, which she sincerely
believes must include kiwi fruit. Kent believes that kiwi is good for the
children, but he also believes that Georgia has genuinely fooled her-
self into thinking that kiwi is essential to the children's diet. Kent
thinks she really continues to put kiwi on the weekly shopping list
11 Id. at 998-99.
12 Id. at 1000, 1008-15.
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because she wants the grocer to continue to say nice things about her
to the head of the foster care agency. Georgia's beliefs about kiwi,
Kent surmises, have conveniently adapted to fit her self-interest.
Week after week, Kent dutifully buys kiwi, even though he thinks
that it's really a waste of good money that could be better spent on
other things. Suppose now that on one particular Monday, the grocer
runs out of kiwi. What should Kent do? It turns out that the only
comparably expensive item the grocer sells, and the only item that
would be in keeping with the terms of Georgia's unspoken bargain, is
soupmeat, which Kent thinks cannot be healthy for the children.
Kent wonders whether he should try to uphold the terms of the bar-
gain, or go to another store in search of kiwi.
If Kent were a court, Georgia a legislature, and the children the
relevant "public," some legal thinkers might suggest that Kent should
buy soupmeat from the grocer in order to preserve the bargain.' 3
Others, however, would probably urge him to go elsewhere in order
to buy kiwi-which is an option not clearly foreclosed under the cir-
cumstances, and which is more in keeping with the best interests of
the children. 14
B. The Supremely-Confident, Life-Tenured Housekeeper
Another variation on the basic Georgia-Kent story that Professor
Greenawalt examines involves what Kent should do if Store X burns
down.15 Under these circumstances, if Kent intends to buy soupmeat
at all, he must go to another store, but which one? The answer is
complicated, as Professor Greenawalt explains, but to encapsulate:
Assuming that (1) Georgia never indicated (expressly or implicitly) an
alternative store in the event Store Xwas unavailable; (2) Kent knew
that Georgia chose Store X based on the quality of its meat; and (3)
Kent thinks that Store Z has better meat than the alternative store
which he thinks Georgia believes has better meat (i.e., Store i), then
Kent may go to Store Z. This conclusion is even stronger if Kent is
confident that his judgment on meat quality is correct, and stronger
still if he and Georgia both understand that he is the "expert" with
respect to meat selection.' 6
13 Cf., e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HAnv. L. REv. 4, 60 (1984) (arguing that courts should enforce
"decisions made by others," including interest-group bargains).
14 Cf, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode 86 COLUM. L. Rnv. 223, 250 (1986) (urging courts to
employ "traditional" methods of statutory interpretation in order "to attain the lawmakers'
stated objectives").
15 Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1017-26.
16 See id. at 1018-20.
1042 [Vol. 82:1039
ARE HOUSEKEEPERS LKE JUDGES?
Now imagine that Kent is a graduate of the School of Culinary
Arts. Overall, Kent was quite a good student, with one notable excep-
tion. He did rather poorly in the course entitled, "Choosing Quality
Meats." He received a "D+." Despite this lapse, Kent managed to
graduate with honors. He attributed the D+ to the poor quality of the
instruction. In fact, he is now supremely confident in his ability to
judge meat quality, and he thinks he is surely a better judge than
Georgia. Georgia, however, thinks otherwise. She has not always
been happy with the cuts Kent brings home and has on occasion ex-
pressed her dissatisfaction, but only in muted grumbles, which Kent
simply shrugs off. He remains secure in the superiority of his judg-
ment, although he is appropriately circumspect and falsely modest
around Georgia.
Imagine further that Kent holds his job for life. We might sup-
pose that Kent was bequeathed to Georgia in her uncle's will, which
stipulates that he must be kept on "during Good Behavior,"17 and that
if Georgia tries to fire him, she will lose her inheritance. Despite his
life tenure, Kent comes from a long line of housekeepers and firmly
believes he is duty-bound to faithfully perform. Yet, from Georgia's
perspective, Kent's self-confidence causes him to fail routinely in dis-
charging this duty with respect to soupmeat selection. He overesti-
mates his own abilities. Kent believes, but wrongly so, that his degree
from the School of Culinary Arts gives him a special ability to select
foodstuffs above and beyond all others.
Some legal thinkers suggest courts are much like Kent. They
claim that judges too often overestimate their own expertise across
too-broad a domain and, as a result, often arrive at erroneous deci-
sions, albeit in good faith.'8 According to this view, courts might
make fewer errors by hewing as close to the legislature's text and lan-
guage as they reasonably can. Others, of course, have a different
view.19
C. Too Many Chefs Ruin the Stew
In the basic Georgia-Kent story, Kent has only Georgia to serve.
Suppose now, however, that Georgia is married to Bill. Georgia and
Bill are foster parents with responsibility for two children. Janet is the
17 Cf U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
18 Cf Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to
Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REv. 715, 732 (1992) ("[Diecisionmakers are likely to
overassess their own competency as decisionmakers, or in other words, underassess the
possibility that their decisions will be mistaken.").
19 Cf ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 48 ("[S]tatutory interpretation is multifaceted and
evolutive rather than single-faceted and static, involves policy choices and discretion by the
interpreter over time as she applies the statute to specific problems, and is responsive to
the current as well as the historical political culture.").
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head of the foster care agency. All of them-Georgia, Bill, and Ja-
net-are charged with the basic obligation of providing for the chil-
dren's welfare, and each takes that obligation very seriously.
Imagine that at the time Georgia and Bill agreed to become fos-
ter parents, they sat down with Janet in order to decide what the chil-
dren's diet would be. In the end, all agreed that soupmeat should be
included as a staple on the weekly shopping list, though for different
reasons. Georgia and Bill like soupmeat because they thought (how-
ever erroneously) that it was nutritious and good for the children's
health. Janet, on the other hand, decided to include soupmeat be-
cause she thought it was inexpensive and tasted good. Indeed, for
Janet, a life lived cheaply and full of good-tasting food is, all else being
equal, better than a life dulled by expensive and poor-tasting health
food, even if the former life may be marginally shorter than the latter.
In the end, however, everyone agreed on the bottom-line directive:
"Buy soupmeat." Kent was sitting at the table when soupmeat was
agreed upon and overheard the entire discussion, though he took no
part in it.
Suppose now that Georgia and Bill are off on a fishing trip,
tucked away in the middle-of-nowhere, incommunicado. As Kent is
preparing to head to Store X to buy his weekly supply of soupmeat,
one of the children hands him a report from the Surgeon General
conclusively showing that soupmeat clogs the arteries and can shorten
one's life, though not dramatically so. In light of this information, the
price of soupmeat has plummeted (though soupmeat tastes as good as
ever). What should Kent do? Does faithful performance mean not
buying the soupmeat, as Georgia and Bill might want? Or should
Kent go ahead and buy the soupmeat despite the Surgeon General's
report, as Janet might want?
Alternatively, suppose that Kent was not present in the room
when the soupmeat discussions unfolded. He has no idea what was
said. He does know, however, thatJanet made some notes during the
meeting. The notes and the original grocery list were put in a folder,
which Georgia and Bill stored securely in the attic along with other
important papers. Georgia and Bill never paid much attention to the
notes, focusing all of their attention on the list itself. Discovering the
notes after hours and hours of searching, Kent scours them thor-
oughly, looking for some guidance and direction. He discovers what
he was looking for tucked away in the final pages of the folder. There,
in Janet's neatest handwriting, is the following notation:
The children should regularly be served soupmeat. Not only is it
cheap, but it tastes wonderful. Who knows whether soupmeat is the




Unbeknownst to Kent, however, neither Bill nor Georgia knew Janet
had included that statement in the notes, nor would they have en-
dorsed it had they known.
If Kent credits Janet's notation and buys soupmeat, has he faith-
fully performed? What if Bill and Georgia (both of whom, say, have
lost parents to heart disease) had said during the talks, "We don't
want the children to eat anything that might increase the risk of a
heart attack," but Janet (who has no heart disease in her family) ne-
glects to jot that remark down? Or, even more darkly, what if Janet
routinely sneaks in notes saying good things about soupmeat because
the grocer makes regular contributions to the foster care agency that
Janet heads?
Some legal thinkers might believe that Kent should ignore Janet's
notes altogether, just as they think courts should ignore legislative his-
tory altogether. Looking to such extraneous sources, they believe, can
entail unreasonable search costs.2 0 What's more, if the evidence of
intent upon which the courts rely has been inserted strategically, it
can also be misleading.21 Finally, some argue that legislative history is
simply illegitimate insofar as the only thing lawmakers agree upon is
the text they enact, not committee reports or any other piece of legis-
lative history.
22
The problems associated with multiple principals arise not only
when different principals say or think different things at the same
time, but also when different principals say or think different things at
different times. Suppose, for example, that Georgia and Bill are tragi-
cally eaten by alligators on their fishing trip. The children now find
themselves with a new foster parent, and Kent now finds himself with
a new boss. Call him Newt. It turns out that Newt hates meat (espe-
cially soupmeat) and is not particularly fond of soup either, though he
naturally thinks soupmeat soup is the worst soup of all. Accordingly,
Newt is thinking about putting the children on a vegetarian diet, ex-
cluding vegetable soup, of course.
Kent knows of Newt's strong aversion to soupmeat, as well as of
his milder aversion to soup of any kind. He also knows that Newt is
thinking seriously about substituting soupless vegetarianism for the
20 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAT=ER OF INTERPRETATION 37 (1997) (noting the large
amount of time lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel spend "poring over... the incunab-
ula of legislative history").
21 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994) ("[GClues [in legislative history] are slanted,
drafted by the staff and perhaps by private interest groups.").
22 See, e.g., ScAijA, supra note 20, at 31 ("I object to the use of legislative history on
principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of law."). But cf.
William'N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rxv. 621, 670-78 (1990) (criticiz-
ing various arguments advanced in favor of ignoring legislative history).
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children's former diet. Kent believes that Georgia and Bill would
have strongly disapproved of Newt's soupless vegetarianism. Both
were firm believers in soupmeat and soup, especially soupmeat soup.
Kent suspects, however, that if he takes it upon himself to prepare
vegetable soup, rather than soupmeat soup, Newt might decide to
drop his plan to completely eliminate soup from the children's diet,
even if he continues to insist on eliminating meat. Moreover, Kent
thinks his plan to save soup will work because the foster care agency
must approve any dietary change that would eliminate soup alto-
gether, and Newt hates dealing with bureaucrats.
Should Kent substitute vegetable soup for soupmeat soup in or-
der to head off Newt's plan to eliminate all soup? What if Kent thinks
that's what Georgia and Bill would have wanted him to do? Or,
should he continue to follow the original Georgia-Bill directive (which
is, after all, still "officially" in force) and continue to buy and make
soupmeat soup, even if his doing so is likely to mean that Newt will
eventually face off with the bureaucrats and win his regime of soupless
vegetarianism?
Some legal thinkers might urge Kent to follow the extant direc-
tive and to continue to buy soupmeat for soupmeat soup no matter
what the consequences. Under this view, courts should follow the law
in effect at the time they decide and not worry about how their deci-
sions will influence future legislative action. 23 In contrast, others
might urge Kent to go ahead and make vegetable soup, on the theory
that Georgia and Bill would (if they were still around) have wanted
him to try to preempt Newt's soupless vegetarianism.
24
Each of the foregoing variations on the basic Georgia-Kent story
tries to move that story a little closer to the realities involved in statu-
tory interpretation (though doing so seems at the same time to move
away from the realities of informal relationships). Lawmakers some-
times do not act for the "public good." Indeed, some modem public
choice theorists suggest that lawmaking in the public good may be
more the exception than the rule.2 5 Likewise, judges who try to act in
the public interest may get it wrong more often than they get it
right. 26 Finally, even when judges are genuinely trying to do what's
best, lawmaking is a complex process involving multiple actors and
23 Cf., e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 69 ("[Tihe right interpretive community is
the one contemporaneous with the enacting Congress.").
24 Cf., e.g., EsMRDGE, supra note 7, at 74 ("[A] legal actor's interpretation of a statute
will be guided not only by her own preferred interpretation, but also... by what the actor
anticipates will be the interpretation of some individual or institution higher up in the
hierarchy of lawmaking authority.").
25 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 14, at 224 ("The widespread acceptance of interest
group theory has led to suspicion about much of what Congress does...
26 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 18, at 732.
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institutions acting and interacting over substantial periods of time. All
these things complicate the effort to determine what faithful perform-
ance means or requires in the world of legal relationships.
II
INTENT IN INTERPRETATION
Because From the Bottom Up is intended to lay the foundation for
future work focusing on the transition from informal contexts to the
more formal context of law, Professor Greenawalt does not enter to-
day's heated debates over legal interpretation, which tend to get espe-
cially hot when statutory interpretation is involved. Making this
transition, he notes, will not be easy.2 7 However, because one upshot
of his analysis is that intent is "very important" in informal contexts,
28
it may be worth rehearsing a few of the reasons why some of the par-
ticipants in the current debate have concluded that intent should mat-
ter less in the context of statutory interpretation than it might in many
informal contexts.2 9
Critics of so-called intentionalism, especially those associated with
the "new textualism,"30 would likely begin by highlighting a ("boringly
familiar"31) nest of problems, such as identifying the individual actors
whose intent counts, determining which mental states-e.g., hopes,
expectations, convictions-come under the heading "intent," aggre-
gating individual intent to arrive at a judgment of collective intent,
and so on.3 2 Indeed, while Professor Greenawalt demonstrates that
subjective intent is often important to faithful performance in infor-
mal contexts, he also shows how difficult and complicated it can be
27 Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1033.
28 Id.
29 Although I rehearse in the text some of the common objections to what is generally
known as "intentionalism," I should hasten to add that intentionalism does not want for
thoughtful and able defenders. See, e.g., ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THE-
ORY 155-84 (1992); Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the
Authority of Intentions, in LAw AND INTERPRETATION: EssAy IN LEGAL PHiLosoPhY 357, 402
(Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
30 I use the term "textualism" indiscriminately to refer to various approaches or meth-
odologies (e.g., plain meaning, ordinary meaning, textualism, and so forth) that, as a fam-
ily, would place comparatively more emphasis on language and text than would other
approaches, such as intentionalism and pragmatism. I realize that important differences
exist between the various approaches I have lumped together under the banner of "textu-
alism," but it seems unnecessary for present purposes to draw any clear distinctions. For a
discussion of some of these differences, see, for example, Robert S. Summers & Geoffrey
Marshall, The Argument from Ordinary Meaning in Statutory Interpretation, 43 N. IR. L.Q. 213,
215-16 (1992).
31 Larry Alexander, Fancy Theories of Interpretation Aren' 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1081, 1081
(1995).
32 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIPRE 313-27 (1986); Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr.,
Legislative Intent, in EssAYs IN LEGAL PHILOsOPHY 254 passim (Robert S. Summers ed., 1970).
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even there to figure out just what the relevant intent is.33 This diffi-
culty, he recognizes, carries over into law.
34
Confronted with these practical difficulties, partisans of textual-
ism tend to believe that an approach to statutory interpretation that
encourages courts to enter into an aggressive search for legislative in-
tent may end up causing more problems than it solves. Three such
problems come to mind.
First, the search for legislative intent may diminish the degree to
which the law reflects the virtues traditionally associated with the rule
of law, among them, stability, predictability, and fairness. 35 Those
who urge the courts to pay greater attention to statutory text place
heavy emphasis on these virtues and worry about the damage done to
them when the courts too quickly abandon text and language in favor
of legislative intent and history.
36
Second, to the extent that reasonable minds can disagree over
what legislative intent is and what it requires, the search for intent may
provide greater scope for strategic and opportunistic behavior from
the willful judge than perhaps would an approach that counseled
closer attention to legislative text and language. Approaches to statu-
tory interpretation that emphasize text may stand a better chance of
limiting the willful judge than do approaches that encourage courts to
set out too early in search of intent.37 In addition, closer attention to
text and language might also reduce the temptation for willful
lawmakers to manufacture evidence of "intent," evidence which may
often reflect little more than the wishes of a particularly important or
powerful constituent.
38
Finally, even if statutory interpretation ideally should be about
discovering and following legislative intent, and even if courts could
be counted on to act as faithful servants in the search for intent, some-
times they will make honest mistakes about what the legislature did in
fact intend. Perhaps they would make fewer of these mistakes if,
rather than searching for intent directly, they instead follow the statu-
tory text and language as far as they legitimately can. If so, then per-
haps we should entertain the idea that, under certain circumstances at
33 Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 1033-34.
34 Id.
35 For an account of these virtues, see, for example, Summers & Marshall, supra note
30, at 226-27.
36 See, e.g., id. at 232 ("[T]he argument from ultimate purpose generally does not
serve what might be called 'rule of law' values as well as the argument from ordinary
meaning.").
37 See, e.g., id. at 231 (arguing that purposive interpretation "invites strong-willed
judges, in effect, to substitute their own views for the views of the legislature").
38 Cf SCALrA, supra note 20, at 34 ("One of the routine tasks of the Washington lawyer-
lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislators can recite in a prewritten 'floor
debate'-or, even better, insert into a committee report.").
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least, an agent may be more likely to hit upon faithful performance if
he doesn't aim at intent directly, and just concentrates on what his
principal instructed. This text-and-language-focused approach will
naturally yield its own fair share of errors, but perhaps it will yield
fewer errors over the long run than would a more direct intention-
seeking approach.3 9 It is, of course, hard to tell in the abstract which
approach would actually minimize the total number of errors.
Having extolled the virtues of textualism, let me note that textual-
ism is not without its own problems, as its able critics have empha-
sized.40 These critics point out, for example, that text can be unclear,
especially in the hard cases that typically come before appellate
courts.4 1 Likewise, the clever and willful judge might be able to ma-
nipulate text just as credibly and readily as she can manipulate legisla-
tive history.42 According to these critics, therefore, any claim that
textualism imposes greater constraints on willful judges may be
illusory.
However the debate between the partisans of textualism and its
detractors is resolved, those drawn to textualism are likely to view the
world of informal relationships very differently than they do the world
of legal relationships, including the relationship between courts and
legislatures. At their best, informal relationships in the world of daily
life are characterized by bonds of mutual respect, trust, cooperation,
and immediacy, whereas the same bonds are far less characteristic of
relationships in the world of law. The textualist may wholeheartedly
endorse the centrality of intent in the informal context, but as she
moves toward the world of law, she is apt to feel more comfortable
with an approach that places less emphasis on intent-even if that
means the courts will sometimes be guilty of unfaithful performance.
CONCLUSION
Housekeepers are not judges, nor are judges housekeepers.
Both, however, labor under an obligation to interpret and faithfully
perform the directives given to them by those in authority. Professor
Greenawalt has shown that we can learn much about interpretation
and faithful performance by looking at it "from the bottom up," and
39 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 18, at 729-30.
40 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 34-47; Eskridge, supra note 22, passim Daniel
Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 89 passim (1995).
41 See, e.g., ESKMDGE, supra note 7, at 38-47.
42 Cf., e.g., RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995)
("[T]he Court has shown a remarkable willingness to attribute a 'plain meaning' to statu-
tory language that was nearly universally believed to have a contrary meaning for many
decades.").
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we can expect to learn much more as he directs his attention to the
practice of interpretation closer to the top.
